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The Reciprocal Multiprincipal and Multiagent
https://kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2000013
https://kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/200001319d831c2-2b71-443a-be76-bf9629d6b524
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
AA11423475_048.pdf (1.2 MB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2023-07-18 | |||||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||||
| タイトル | The Reciprocal Multiprincipal and Multiagent | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||||
| 著者 |
崔, 康植
× 崔, 康植
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| 抄録 | ||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | In this paper, we explain such reciprocal relationships under different organizations in terms of optimal tradeoff between incentive-provision and risk-sharing. We analyze a simple model of multiprincipal and multiagent, in which two firms within two persons play interchanging roles of agent and principal, and show that optimal contracts can provide more incentives in reciprocal relationships. There exists a reverse ratchet effect; the firstperiod agent exerts more effort in order to make the next-period agent infer more favorable environments, and to make him demand less wages. However, by different form of organization contract, we show that reciprocal relationships alleviate or strengthen moral hazard, and analyze that optimal contracts can provide more incentives in reciprocal relationships under each firm's joint responsibility than under sole responsibility relationships. In fact, the optimal incentive coefficient for the second-period agent increases because the inference from the first-period results in more uncertainties. Although there exists a reverse ratchet effect on the first-period agent incentives if information is relatively stable, then he or she exerts less effort. This implication is the usual ratchet effect, where the principal reacts to information that costs of effort are lower by reducing the pay of the agent when team performance is relatively easy to measure. Thus, when sequential reciprocal relationship is present, optimal contracts can provide less incentives in period 1. We observe reciprocal relationships among firms in the subcontractor system to explain some features. | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
en : The Institute of Economic Research working paper series 巻 48, p. 1-15, 発行日 2001-12 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||||||||
| 出版者 | Institute of Economic Research, Kagawa University | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||||
| 出版者 | 香川大学経済研究所 | |||||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||||
| ISSN | ||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | PISSN | |||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 0915-2288 | |||||||||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11423475 | |||||||||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
| 主題 | multiprincipal | |||||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
| 主題 | reciprocal agency | |||||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
| 主題 | ratchet effect | |||||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
| 主題 | reverse ratchet effect | |||||||||||
