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  1. 香川大学紀要類・刊行物等
  2. 経済学部・経済学研究科・経済研究所(旧:高松高等商業学校・高松経済専門学校)
  3. The Institute of Economic Research working paper series

The Reciprocal Multiprincipal and Multiagent

https://kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2000013
https://kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2000013
19d831c2-2b71-443a-be76-bf9629d6b524
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
AA11423475_048.pdf AA11423475_048.pdf (1.2 MB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2023-07-18
タイトル
タイトル The Reciprocal Multiprincipal and Multiagent
言語 en
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
資源タイプ departmental bulletin paper
アクセス権
アクセス権 open access
アクセス権URI http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
著者 崔, 康植

× 崔, 康植

ja 崔, 康植

ja-Kana サイ, コウショク

en Choi, Kang-Sik
Choi, Kangsik

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内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 In this paper, we explain such reciprocal relationships under different organizations in terms of optimal tradeoff between incentive-provision and risk-sharing. We analyze a simple model of multiprincipal and multiagent, in which two firms within two persons play interchanging roles of agent and principal, and show that optimal contracts can provide more incentives in reciprocal relationships. There exists a reverse ratchet effect; the firstperiod agent exerts more effort in order to make the next-period agent infer more favorable environments, and to make him demand less wages. However, by different form of organization contract, we show that reciprocal relationships alleviate or strengthen moral hazard, and analyze that optimal contracts can provide more incentives in reciprocal relationships under each firm's joint responsibility than under sole responsibility relationships. In fact, the optimal incentive coefficient for the second-period agent increases because the inference from the first-period results in more uncertainties. Although there exists a reverse ratchet effect on the first-period agent incentives if information is relatively stable, then he or she exerts less effort. This implication is the usual ratchet effect, where the principal reacts to information that costs of effort are lower by reducing the pay of the agent when team performance is relatively easy to measure. Thus, when sequential reciprocal relationship is present, optimal contracts can provide less incentives in period 1. We observe reciprocal relationships among firms in the subcontractor system to explain some features.
言語 en
書誌情報 en : The Institute of Economic Research working paper series

巻 48, p. 1-15, 発行日 2001-12
出版者
出版者 Institute of Economic Research, Kagawa University
言語 en
出版者
出版者 香川大学経済研究所
言語 ja
ISSN
収録物識別子タイプ PISSN
収録物識別子 0915-2288
書誌レコードID
収録物識別子タイプ NCID
収録物識別子 AA11423475
著者版フラグ
出版タイプ VoR
出版タイプResource http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 multiprincipal
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 reciprocal agency
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 ratchet effect
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 reverse ratchet effect
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