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The Performance Measurement m the Reciprocal Agency
https://kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2000015
https://kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2000015a7faeaf6-ddd1-4ee5-8992-d74d0993dde8
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
AA11423475_060.pdf (2.2 MB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2023-07-18 | |||||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||||
| タイトル | The Performance Measurement m the Reciprocal Agency | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
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| 言語 | eng | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||||
| 著者 |
崔, 康植
× 崔, 康植
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| 抄録 | ||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | In this paper, I develop a reciprocal agency model in wihch agents differ in marginal effort for the performance, and derive basic implications for this framework, introducing Baker (1992) 's framework. In the two-period the reciprocal relationship, informed firm A works for firm B in period 1, and informed firm B works for A in period 2, while in the simultaneous version, two relationships with informed agent concur. Contracts specify greater or smaller incentive coefficient for the first period agent because she/he has different knowledge about the marginal effort, faces critical values of cost of each firm. Hence, as the value of the superior knowledge about the marginal effort increases, each firm is determined the critical level of cost. This variation of cost makes each firm to exert effort more or less. Thus, there is trade-off of the optimal cost of effort in period 1 and A's sorting problem in period 2 about B's honesty because making favorable inference against drawbacks of losing information about the firm B's gaming incentive toward compensation scheme. As a result, social surplus of effort of distortion can arise due to inefficient behavioral responses even though each firm is assumed risk neutral. Morever, given fixing compensation of firm A in the first period, increasing of risky environment makes real incentive coefficient to increase, illustrating trade-off relationship between the cost and sorting. Thus, uncertainties affect indirectly to incentive, there can be a positive relationship between risk and incentives in the first period, while is not in the second period. Our theoretical results are consistent with some empirical findings. | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
en : The Institute of Economic Research working paper series 巻 60, p. 1-23, 発行日 2002-09 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||||||||
| 出版者 | Institute of Economic Research, Kagawa University | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||||
| 出版者 | 香川大学経済研究所 | |||||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||||
| ISSN | ||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | PISSN | |||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 0915-2288 | |||||||||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11423475 | |||||||||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
| 主題 | reciprocal agency | |||||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
| 主題 | trade-off between cost and sorting | |||||||||||
