{"created":"2023-07-20T08:40:13.032551+00:00","id":2000036,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"378bcd77-d00e-4ac8-99cf-7f6e5d6eeb08"},"_deposit":{"created_by":11,"id":"2000036","owner":"11","owners":[11],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"2000036"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:02000036","sets":["1:49:1206"]},"author_link":["3005"],"item_10002_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2004-03-17","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"12","bibliographicPageStart":"1","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"85","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"The Institute of Economic Research working paper series","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_10002_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"If inefficient agents have a positive morale for their productivity, their optimal efforts are larger than those of efficient agents, which satisfy the single-crossing property in the linear wage scheme. Moreover, we show that more efficient agents receive a real high piece rate and obtain information rent with less exertion at the optimum. This result stands in contrast to the standard agency models in which agents receive a higher piece rate with more effort.","subitem_description_language":"en","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_10002_publisher_8":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"Institute of Economic Research, Kagawa University","subitem_publisher_language":"en"},{"subitem_publisher":"香川大学経済研究所","subitem_publisher_language":"ja"}]},"item_10002_source_id_11":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11423475","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_10002_source_id_9":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"0915-2288","subitem_source_identifier_type":"PISSN"}]},"item_10002_version_type_20":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"open access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorAlternatives":[{"creatorAlternative":"Choi, Kang-Sik","creatorAlternativeLang":"en"}],"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"崔, 康植","creatorNameLang":"ja"},{"creatorName":"サイ, コウショク","creatorNameLang":"ja-Kana"},{"creatorName":"Choi, Kangsik","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"3005","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"},{"nameIdentifier":"9000002341638","nameIdentifierScheme":"CiNii ID","nameIdentifierURI":"http://ci.nii.ac.jp/nrid/9000002341638"},{"nameIdentifier":"0000-0002-0918-7022","nameIdentifierScheme":"ORCID","nameIdentifierURI":"https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0918-7022"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_access","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2023-07-20"}],"filename":"AA11423475_085.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"102 KB"}],"format":"application/pdf","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"objectType":"fulltext","url":"https://kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2000036/files/AA11423475_085.pdf"},"version_id":"f507d2c2-7abe-4840-a1ad-599501b7942c"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"linear contract","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"fixed wage","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"morale","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Linear Incentive Contract with Different Types of Agents","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Linear Incentive Contract with Different Types of Agents","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"10002","owner":"11","path":["1206"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"PubDate","attribute_value":"2023-07-20"},"publish_date":"2023-07-20","publish_status":"0","recid":"2000036","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Linear Incentive Contract with Different Types of Agents"],"weko_creator_id":"11","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2024-04-19T02:11:54.102814+00:00"}