{"created":"2023-07-20T08:59:47.108393+00:00","id":2000037,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"bf19bcbe-7f39-4792-b893-8e14a16a1c36"},"_deposit":{"created_by":11,"id":"2000037","owner":"11","owners":[11],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"2000037"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:02000037","sets":["1:49:1206"]},"author_link":["3005"],"item_10002_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2004-04-28","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"15","bibliographicPageStart":"1","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"88","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"The Institute of Economic Research working paper series","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_10002_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"In this paper, we introduce that the principal and the agent can contract at the ex ante stage, and allow for risk-averse agents with inequity aversion to analyze the properties of the optimal incentive scheme under adverse selection. Under inequity restrictive conditions, ex ante contracting structures often differ from those predicted by standard solutions of canonical adverse selection problem and the case of contracts offered at interim stage with inequity aversion.","subitem_description_language":"en","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_10002_publisher_8":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"Institute of Economic Research, Kagawa University","subitem_publisher_language":"en"},{"subitem_publisher":"香川大学経済研究所","subitem_publisher_language":"ja"}]},"item_10002_source_id_11":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11423475","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_10002_source_id_9":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"0915-2288","subitem_source_identifier_type":"PISSN"}]},"item_10002_version_type_20":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"open access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorAlternatives":[{"creatorAlternative":"Choi, Kang-Sik","creatorAlternativeLang":"en"}],"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"崔, 康植","creatorNameLang":"ja"},{"creatorName":"サイ, コウショク","creatorNameLang":"ja-Kana"},{"creatorName":"Choi, Kangsik","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"3005","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"},{"nameIdentifier":"9000002341638","nameIdentifierScheme":"CiNii ID","nameIdentifierURI":"http://ci.nii.ac.jp/nrid/9000002341638"},{"nameIdentifier":"0000-0002-0918-7022","nameIdentifierScheme":"ORCID","nameIdentifierURI":"https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0918-7022"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_access","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2023-07-20"}],"filename":"AA11423475_088.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"116 KB"}],"format":"application/pdf","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"objectType":"fulltext","url":"https://kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2000037/files/AA11423475_088.pdf"},"version_id":"6fb8bb71-bbd3-48a8-a549-69c3eb7c4bf7"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"ex ante contracting","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"inequity aversion","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"risk-averse agent","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"information rent","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"adverse selection","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Risk-Averse Agents with Inequity Aversion, Ex Ante Contracting and Adverse Selection","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Risk-Averse Agents with Inequity Aversion, Ex Ante Contracting and Adverse Selection","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"10002","owner":"11","path":["1206"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"PubDate","attribute_value":"2023-07-20"},"publish_date":"2023-07-20","publish_status":"0","recid":"2000037","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Risk-Averse Agents with Inequity Aversion, Ex Ante Contracting and Adverse Selection"],"weko_creator_id":"11","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2024-04-19T02:11:54.312116+00:00"}