@article{oai:kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00009699,
 author = {Miyazaki, Koichi and 宮﨑, 浩一},
 journal = {The Institute of Economic Research working paper series},
 month = {Jan},
 note = {This paper considers an overlapping‐generations model with pay‐as‐you‐go social security and retirement decision making by an old agent. In addition, the paper assumes that labor productivity depreciates. Under this setting, socially optimal allocations are examined. The first‐best allocation is an allocation that maximizes welfare when a social planner distributes resources and forces an old agent to work and retire as she wants. The second‐best allocation is an allocation that maximizes welfare when she can use only pay‐as‐you‐go social security in a decentralized economy. The paper finds a range of an old agent’s labor productivity such that the first‐best allocation is achieved in the decentralized economy. This differs from the finding in Michel and Pestieau [“Social security and early retirement in an overlapping‐generations growth model”, Annals of Economics & Finance, 2013] that the first‐best allocation cannot be achieved in the decentralized economy., This paper was previously circulated under the title, “Optimal pay-as-you-go social security when retirement is endogenous and labor productivity depreciates.”},
 pages = {1--33},
 title = {Optimal pay‐as‐you‐go social security with endogenous retirement},
 volume = {200},
 year = {2016},
 yomi = {ミヤザキ, コウイチ}
}