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Optimal pay‐as‐you‐go social security with endogenous retirement
https://kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/9699
https://kagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/9699d46a605d-9635-4cb7-afae-8fd2f7804d9c
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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AA11423475_200 (304.0 kB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2022-06-08 | |||||||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||||||
| タイトル | Optimal pay‐as‐you‐go social security with endogenous retirement | |||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||||||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||||||
| 著者 |
宮﨑, 浩一
× 宮﨑, 浩一
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| 抄録 | ||||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||||||
| 内容記述 | This paper considers an overlapping‐generations model with pay‐as‐you‐go social security and retirement decision making by an old agent. In addition, the paper assumes that labor productivity depreciates. Under this setting, socially optimal allocations are examined. The first‐best allocation is an allocation that maximizes welfare when a social planner distributes resources and forces an old agent to work and retire as she wants. The second‐best allocation is an allocation that maximizes welfare when she can use only pay‐as‐you‐go social security in a decentralized economy. The paper finds a range of an old agent’s labor productivity such that the first‐best allocation is achieved in the decentralized economy. This differs from the finding in Michel and Pestieau [“Social security and early retirement in an overlapping‐generations growth model”, Annals of Economics & Finance, 2013] that the first‐best allocation cannot be achieved in the decentralized economy. | |||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||||||
| 内容記述 | This paper was previously circulated under the title, “Optimal pay-as-you-go social security when retirement is endogenous and labor productivity depreciates.” | |||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
en : The Institute of Economic Research working paper series 巻 200, p. 1-33, 発行日 2016-01-18 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||||||||||
| 出版者 | 香川大学経済研究所 | |||||||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||||||
| 出版者 | Institute of Economic Research, Kagawa University | |||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||||
| ISSN | ||||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | PISSN | |||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 0915-2288 | |||||||||||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11423475 | |||||||||||||
| 論文ID（NAID） | ||||||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isIdenticalTo | |||||||||||||
| 識別子タイプ | NAID | |||||||||||||
| 関連識別子 | 40022345346 | |||||||||||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||||
| 主題 | optimal pay-as-you-go social security | |||||||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||||
| 主題 | endogenous retirement | |||||||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||||
| 主題 | depreciation of labor productivity | |||||||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||||
| 主題 | first-best and second-best allocation | |||||||||||||
